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Abstract: We study the development of bargaining behavior in children age seven through 18, 
using ultimatum and dictator games. We find that bargaining behavior changes substantially with 
age and that most of this change appears to be related to changes in preferences for fairness, 
rather than bargaining ability. Younger children make and accept smaller ultimatum proposals 
than do older children, Even young children are quite strategic in their behavior, making much 
smaller dictator than ultimatum proposals. Boys claim to be more aggressive bargainers than 
girls do, but they are not. Older girls make larger dictator proposals than older boys, but overall 
participants dictator proposals differ more by height than by sex. We argue that the existence of 
systematic differences in bargaining behavior across age and sex supports the argument that 
culture is a determinant of economic behavior, and suggests that people acquire this culture 
during childhood.  
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While Adam Smith believed that the propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange” was a 
part of human nature1, it seems unlikely that these behaviors are completely determined at birth. 
Instead it seems probable that they are at least in part acquired during childhood. In this paper we 
report on the results of a study that uses economic experiments to examine the development of 
bargaining behavior in children from age seven to eighteen. 
There are good reasons to study bargaining in children. One motivation is that studying 
bargaining in children may teach us more about bargaining by adults. In most bargaining 
situations optimal decisions depend on an understanding of how others will respond. Beliefs 
about fairness, and about what others believe to be acceptable, are important considerations. 
Very little work has been done on when or how these beliefs and knowledge are acquired. We 
think it’s likely that people learn how to bargain at the same time they learn so much else - when 
they are children. We know that adults exhibit wide variations in bargaining behavior, both 
within and across cultures. It seems likely that these variations lead to different outcomes in such 
matters as wages, job searches, and housing and auto purchases. Studying the development of 
bargaining behavior will lead to more knowledge about the sources of this heterogeneity in both 
behavior and in economic outcomes.  
Another set of reasons arise because children make many important decisions that 
involve bargaining with others. Many family decisions, with important consequences for adults 
and children, are the result of bargaining between parents and children. An understanding of how 
children bargain will lead to better models of these  decisions. For example, rich parents often 
want their children to make larger investments in education than the children themselves want to 
make, while poor parents often prefer smaller investments. Parents and children bargain 
extensively over the size of these investments, over who will make the sacrifices needed to 
finance them, and over what kind of education will be acquired. The outcome of this bargaining 
process will obviously depend in part on the bargaining abilities of the parties involved. An 
understanding of how these strategies change with variables such as age and sex may also lead to 
                                                 
1 Smith (1776/1937) 
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a better modeling of human capital accumulation. Another important example involves 
bargaining between children. Research on education consistently shows the importance of peer 
effects. Modeling how peer effects work requires an understanding of how children with 
different preferences influence each other’s decisions, which is in part a bargaining question. 
We use the ultimatum game to study bargaining behavior. For this game two children are 
paired anonymously and assigned the role of proposer or responder. The proposer suggests how 
to split some money. If the responder accepts, each gets the amount proposed. If the responder 
rejects, neither gets anything. If both players only care about their own payoffs then the proposer 
should offer the smallest possible amount, and the responder should accept. But, there are two 
reasons to make larger proposals: the proposer might care about the responder’s payoff, or she 
might fear that responder cares about fairness and will reject a small proposal. To distinguish 
between these two motives we also conducted dictator game experiments. The dictator game is 
the same as the ultimatum game except the responder has no ability to reject: he just gets 
whatever the proposer offers. In combination these two games allow us to separate proposals into 
a fairness component and a strategic component, where the second component is due to a 
calculation of the chance that a small proposal will be rejected.  
We did both experiments on a total of 310 children, in second through twelfth grade 
classrooms. Almost all the children acted strategically, making larger ultimatum than dictator 
proposals. We found significant differences in behavior in both games across age, sex, and 
height. Young children made considerably smaller dictator and ultimatum proposals than older 
children and adults. Interestingly, they were also more likely to accept small proposals. As a 
result, when acting as proposers in the ultimatum games, the youngest children actually earned 
more than the older ones. Older girls made larger proposals than older boys. Among the younger 
children, shorter girls made much larger proposals than tall ones, particularly in the dictator 
games. Last, we found that children’s self-reported propensity to reject “unfair” ultimatum offers 
was substantially exaggerated, and that all this exaggeration came from boys.  
We conclude that children are good bargainers by the age of seven. Like adults they have 
preferences about their own payoff and the payoffs of others. Their choices show that they 
understand that the optimal bargaining strategy depends on the situation and on the preferences 
of those with whom they are bargaining, and that they have a working knowledge of what those 
preferences are. However, we do not find that these preferences are fixed, homogenous, or 
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unexplainable: they vary substantially across age, sex, and relative height. We believe that these 
results not only support existing work on the existence of cultural differences in economic 
behavior, they also suggest two new directions for further research in that area: one into how 
cultural influences affect behavior, and another into the origins of differences in behavior within 
a culture. 
This paper begins with a brief review of the literature from economics, anthropology, and 
developmental psychology. This is followed by a description of our protocol. We begin the 
analysis of our experimental results with a descriptive section comparing proposals in the 
ultimatum and dictator games. We then trace the development of concerns for fairness by 
looking at how dictator proposals and ultimatum rejections vary with age and height. Next we 
look at strategic considerations: how good are children at making optimal ultimatum proposals, 
given the probabilities that small offers will be rejected? We then compare children’s actual and 
stated behavior. In the conclusion we discuss some of the implications of these results. 
 
II: Literature Review 
 
The economic literature on bargaining is extensive, and a more comprehensive review is 
in Roth (1995). Since devised by Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), the ultimatum 
experiment has been done many times. Proposals typically have a mode at 50% of the 
endowment and a mean of about 40%. Proposals smaller than this are often rejected, even when 
the sums involved are very large, as in Cameron (1999), who conducts the experiments on 
Indonesians using amounts equivalent to several months’ wages. While these results are very 
different from the subgame perfect Nash predictions for selfish preferences, they are not 
necessarily irrational. Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
have created models of preferences for fairness that can accommodate this behavior. 
There is evidence that ultimatum behavior varies across cultures. Roth, et al. (1991) study 
students from four different countries. For their first round ultimatum experiments, average 
proposals range from 36% in Israel to 47% in the United States. Correspondingly, Israelis are 
more likely to accept a given proposal than Americans. Henrich (2000) compares ultimatum 
bargaining behavior (over amounts equivalent to several day’s wages) between members of the 
Machiguenga tribe in Peru with that of graduate students in the UCLA anthropology department. 
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He finds that the mean offer among the Machiguenga is only 26% of the endowment, and even 
lower offers are almost always accepted, while at UCLA the mean offer was 48%, and many 
people at least claimed that they would reject lower amounts. He argues that this provides 
evidence for cultural differences in economic behavior, and he attributes the Machiguenga’s 
behavior to their culture, which involves few economic relationships outside of the family. 
Henrich, et al. (2001) report further results from 15 small-scale societies, and argue that 
differences in the general level of social interactions within a culture can explain differences in 
behaviors across societies.  
In addition to this evidence that culture matters in bargaining there is some evidence of 
systematic behavioral differences within a culture. Eckel and Grossman (2001) report that in 
their experiments female college students make statistically significantly larger ultimatum offers 
than males. While the proposal differences were small, they also found that females were much 
less likely to reject a given offer. Solnick (2000) also looks at ultimatum games and finds no sex 
differences in ultimatum proposals, but that female students were much less likely to reject 
proposals. Croson and Buchan (1999) look for differences in behavior in the “trust game” for 
different sexes in different countries. They find no differences across countries, but in general 
women return a larger proportion of the money sent them by an anonymous partner than men do. 
There is also work on sex differences in dictator games. Eckel and Grossman (1998) report that 
men give 8% of their endowment, women 16%. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) do a version of 
the dictator game with different endowments and costs of giving, and find that men’s proposals 
are more sensitive to price than women’s. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) find that even when using 
identical bargaining strategies car dealers quote higher prices to (American) women and blacks 
than to white men. This could be a consequence of the dealers reacting to systematic differences 
in bargaining behaviors among regular customers, but it could also result from discrimination or 
differences in average reservation prices among these groups.  
Several papers report on across subjects comparisons of behavior in ultimatum and 
dictator games. In their treatments with real payoffs, Forsythe, et al. (1994) find that proposals in 
the ultimatum games are significantly larger than those in the dictator games: 46% versus 22% of 
the pie. They conclude that the ultimatum offers are due in part to fear of rejection, and in part to 
concern for the other person’s payoff. Anderson, Rodgers and Rodriguez (2000) compare 
ultimatum and dictator behavior for university students in the U.S. and in Honduras. They find 
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that while in the U.S. people make smaller dictator proposals if they do ultimatum bargaining 
first, order has no effect with the Honduran participants. 
There is one previous study of children and ultimatum games. Murnighan and Saxon 
(1998) report on a study of bargaining attitudes in children from kindergarten through ninth 
grade. In face to face interviews they asked individual children, recruited from public school 
classes, what offers they would make and accept in hypothetical ultimatum bargaining situations 
involving first money and then candy. In general, subjects seemed much more interested in 
candy than money, and they often said very different things across the money and candy 
treatments. They found that the proposals kindergartners gave were quite unstrategic: sometimes 
they told the experimenter they would give away everything. Third graders said they would 
make smaller proposals than sixth graders did. Third grade boys seemed the most strategic, and 
boys in general were more likely to say they would take advantage of others in treatments where 
they had better information. For responses, the only significant age difference was that the 
youngest children said they were more likely to accept very small proposals.  
In addition to this economic literature, there is a large literature from developmental 
psychology that relates, sometimes indirectly, to the development of bargaining behavior. Most 
of this literature is concerned with how “prosocial” reasoning and behavior develop with age and 
differ across sexes, and what factors encourage such behavior. Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) 
provide a comprehensive survey. The word prosocial includes things such as cooperative 
behavior, distinctions between what is right and what is wrong, compliance with social norms, 
and absence of criminality. This literature is at least as concerned with how children reason about 
these issues as about their behavior, and the methodology is often very different from that used 
in economic experiments. Many studies use surveys or interviews, often asking mothers to 
describe their children’s behavior. Some involve observations in classrooms and playgrounds, 
and a few involve laboratory simulations of real life situations, using puppets or similar devices. 
The experiments often involve some sort of deception and generally do not have salient payoffs. 
Kohlberg (1976) is perhaps the most widely cited work in this field. Kohlberg used 
survey data on how children reason about a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas to argue that 
children pass through a series of stages of moral development. He found that the biggest shift 
occurs around age 12, when children begin to move away from seeing moral behavior as a matter 
of obeying rigid rules and towards seeing it as being a matter of fulfilling obligations to others. 
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As with earlier theories that have proposed discreet stages of development, e.g. Piaget (1965), 
attempts to link these stages of reasoning with actual behavior have met with mixed success. 
However, a meta-analysis of 125 studies by Fabes and Eisenberg (1996), does find that prosocial 
behaviors generally increase with age. Studies in which simulated or actual donating took place 
found larger age affects than did surveys. Eisenberg (1986) has shown a positive correlation 
between prosocial reasoning and cognitive ability within ages, and argues that the age trend is in 
part due to an increasing capacity for the sort of cognitive reasoning that is needed to keep score 
and figure out what is fair and what is not. 
Perhaps the most related experiment from this literature is Keil (1986). Keil showed 
second and sixth grade children a videotape of another child, telling them that this was live video 
and that the two of them would be simultaneously sorting letters by zip-code, for a nickel per 
letter. Treatments had the videotaped child performing their part of the task either quickly or 
slowly. At the end of each round, the subject and the co-worker (actually, the experimenter, who 
decided randomly) allocated the pair’s earnings between themselves, taking turns as to who 
decided the split. Older children were less vengeful after the “co-worker” had divided the nickels 
unfairly, and were more likely to reciprocate fair and generous distributions. (In the end, every 
participant was give the same $2.50 payoff.) 
The development of sex differences has also received attention from psychologists. The 
meta-analysis by Fabes and Eisenberg (1996) documents differences in prosocial reasoning, 
(girls are better) but reports that differences in actual behavior are not so strong. They also show 
that there is a general increase in sex differences with age, with some research finding that the 
differences arise during adolescence. They caution that much of this research suffers from using 
sex-biased definitions of pro-social behavior. For example, girls might report yes when asked if 
they would give up their lunch milk to feed a stray kitten, but boys might say yes if asked if they 
would rescue a kitten from a tree, particularly if use of a ladder or a fire-truck was involved. 
 Last, there is a substantial literature on the effect of physical characteristics on wages. 
Perhaps the paper with the closest connection to this work is Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman 
(2001). The authors find that while taller men earn more than short ones, all this correlation can 
be explained using height at age 16. Height as an adult does not add any additional explanatory 
power. They attribute this to the fact that taller adolescents report having larger social networks, 
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which they hypothesize lead to the development of skills that are valuable in the labor market. 
This suggests that childhood developmental factors have important consequences for adults. 
 By conducting standard economic bargaining experiments on children we make several 
contributions to this literature. We are able to compare children’s behavior to what others have 
already documented for adults, and we can compare the differences that have been found across 
cultures with differences across age. We can look at how the sex differences in bargaining that 
have been reported by others occur with age. Last, we can ask whether children are strategic 
bargainers – do their proposals make sense, given the rules of the game and the odds of rejection. 
 
III. Participants and protocol 
 
 We modified the usual dictator and ultimatum protocols so as to make them 
understandable to children. The instructions are in the appendix. We obtained permission from 
the Coquille and Myrtle Point, Oregon public school districts to run experiments in their schools 
and then asked individual teachers for permission to conduct the experiments in their classrooms. 
Coquille and Myrtle Point are logging and farming towns with populations of about 4,000, and 
our samples range from about 50% to 90% of the local population in each age group. Since 
school attendance is mandatory, and few children in these towns go to private schools or are 
home schooled, we avoid the usual problems of over-sampling children from richer and more 
educated families present in self-selected samples. Our sample is also more representative of the 
population from which it is drawn than is typical for economic experiments. On the other hand, 
while our sample is representative of children in these towns, it is not representative of the 
national population of children, and it also differs from the samples of college students on which 
most experiments are conducted.  
 We did the experiments on 310 children in second, fourth, fifth, ninth, and twelfth grades. 
The twelfth-graders are included because they are close in age to college freshmen, but closer in 
other respects to the rest of our sample. We did not collect data on individual ages, but the 
average ages of these groups are seven, nine, ten, fourteen, and eighteen respectively, and 
variations of more than a year are rare. Since the experiments were conducted in their regular 
classrooms, children always played against others of the same age. They also knew the other 
players, though their specific partners were anonymous and they made their decisions secretly. 
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Each participant played two ultimatum games, once as proposer and once as responder, and two 
dictator games, again as both proposer and responder. They were told that multiple games would 
be played, but not how many of each or of what type. We paid them after each round, and 
matched them with a different player each time.  
Each game was played with an endowment of ten tokens. The ninth and twelfth graders 
could exchange tokens for cash at the end of the experiment, at preannounced rates of $0.25 and 
$0.50 per token. The younger children could use the tokens to buy toys and school supplies from 
us at the end of the experiment. We told them that each token was worth about $0.25, and that 
our prices were about the same as in a regular store. It was very clear that these payoffs were 
sufficient to engage the interest of all the age groups. 
We conducted two versions of the experiment, one starting with the dictator game and 
another with the ultimatum game. Within each version there were two groups of subjects, those 
whose initial role was as a proposer, and those who started as a responder. Subjects kept the 
same initial role for both games, so that while everyone played each role in each game, they did 
so in one of four different treatments, with their roles ordered as follows: 
 
Version A: 
     Treatment 1: dictator proposer, dictator responder, ultimatum proposer, ultimatum responder. 
     Treatment 2: dictator responder, dictator proposer, ultimatum responder, ultimatum proposer. 
Version B: 
     Treatment 3: ultimatum proposer, ultimatum responder, dictator proposer, dictator responder. 
     Treatment 4: ultimatum responder, ultimatum proposer, dictator responder, dictator proposer. 
 
Note that with our design some people make, say, their dictator proposal in the first round 
of the experiment, while others make it in the second, and so on. The number of participants by 
grade and experiment version are shown in the appendix. In the analysis, we pool the fourth and 




We start with descriptive data by age and across games. We show that there are 
significant differences in proposals across age groups and that even the youngest children make 
very different proposals in the dictator and the ultimatum games, indicating that they understand 
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the protocol and that they play strategically. We then look at how behavior is affected by the 
order in which a game is played and by experience. The next sub-section examines demographic 
effects. We find that proposals vary with sex and height, as well as with age. Then we look at 
whether children’s ultimatum proposals are optimal, given the observed rejection rates. We 
follow this with a within-subjects comparison of behaviors across games, and finally we compare 
stated and actual rejection decisions. 
 
Descriptive results by age and game 
 
Table I shows averages and standard deviations for proposals in the dictator and 
ultimatum games and for the proportion of proposals rejected, by grade.2 There are several 
interesting results. First, children’s behavior is broadly similar to that found in the many previous 
experiments on adults. Average behavior in both games is different from the subgame perfect 
Nash predictions for selfish people. Dictator proposals are greater than zero, ultimatum proposals 
are much higher than the sub-game perfect prediction of zero or one, and rejection rates are non-
zero for every age group. Only the second grader’s dictator proposals come close to the Nash 
prediction of zero. We find that even the youngest children make larger ultimatum than dictator 
proposals. Second, we find that dictator proposals increase substantially with age. Ultimatum 
proposals also increase but by a smaller amount, and most of the increase occurs from second to 
fourth/fifth grade. The variance of the dictator proposals increases and then decreases with age, 
while that of ultimatum proposals decreases steadily. 
Figure I shows the possible combinations of proposals in the dictator game and in the 
ultimatum game, with the percentage of children making each combination on the vertical axis. 
Over all participants, the modal proposal combination is five tokens in the ultimatum game and 
zero in the dictator game. Combinations in the northwest quadrants of these figures are 
“strategic” in the sense that they involve a larger proposal in the ultimatum game, where there is 
a possibility of rejection, than in the dictator game. Overall, 78% of the participants make strictly 
larger ultimatum proposals, while 92% of the second graders do. Only 7% of  kids make a 
                                                 
2 Table A.II in the appendix shows the results of Mann-Whitney and Epps-Singleton tests of differences in these 
proposals across grades. Dictator and ultimatum proposals by second graders differ from those of every other age, 
with either test. Dictator and ultimatum proposals for any age are significantly different at better than the 1% level, 
with either test.  
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dictator proposal that is larger than their ultimatum proposal, and only one of the 74 second 
graders does this. We conclude that children, even the youngest ones, have a good understanding 
of the protocols used in these games, and that evidence of strategic behavior can be seen even in 
the youngest participants. 
Figure I also reveals some interesting differences across ages. Among second graders, 
most of the heterogeneity is in ultimatum proposals, while hardly anybody gives any tokens 
away in the dictator game. The opposite holds among the twelfth graders - dictator proposals 
cover the range from zero to five, while ultimatum proposals are almost all either four or five. 
Only a few second graders offer anything close to an even division in both games, while a 
substantial proportion of the older participants, particularly twelfth graders, do so. For all grades 
except twelfth, the modal combination of proposals is zero in the dictator game and five in the 
ultimatum. 
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Table I: Dictator and ultimatum proposals and rejection rates, by grade. 
Grade n Dictator proposal Ultimatum proposal Rejection rate 
2 74 0.35 (1.0) 3.5 (1.7) 0.11 (0.31) 
4 106 1.4 (2.1) 4.1 (1.6) 0.14 (0.35) 
9 90 1.2 (1.8) 4.5 (0.89) 0.033 (0.18) 
12 40 2.1 (1.2) 4.3 (0.69) 0.10 (0.30) 
all 310 1.2 (1.2) 4.1 (1.4) 0.10 (0.30) 
Note: Means, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Figure I: Dictator / ultimatum proposal cross tabs, by grade. 









































































Order and History 
 
With our protocol there are two reasons why the round in which a decision is made might 
affect behavior. First, behavior might be affected by history. For example, if someone rejects 
what you feel was a perfectly reasonable ultimatum proposal, you might feel justified in 
subsequently making a smaller dictator proposal than you otherwise would have, even to a 
different partner. Or you might then decide that maybe your proposal wasn’t so reasonable after 
all, and give more in the dictator game, thinking that somehow makes up for it. Second, 
decisions in one game may be affected by the simple fact that a person played another game first, 
regardless of the particular events of that game. For example, people may make smaller 
proposals in later dictator games because, say, playing an ultimatum game reminds them of 
competition and makes them less generous, regardless of their particular experience in that game. 
(Similar effects might derive from playing the role of proposer before responder.)  
These possibilities create both a problem, in that they complicate the analysis of 
differences in behavior with respect to demographic variables, and an opportunity, in that by 
looking at how ordering of the games and individual variations in history affect behavior we can 
gain some insight into what drives behavior. Figure II shows average dictator and ultimatum 
proposals by grade and by round. For both games and for most rounds, proposals by second 
graders are smaller than those of the older children. Dictator game proposals show the biggest 
changes with order, particularly for the older participants. If the dictator game is played first, 
proposals by twelfth graders are larger than those of any other age group – and as large as twelfth 
graders’ first round ultimatum proposals. If the ultimatum game is played first, the subsequent 
dictator proposals by twelfth graders are much smaller, as small as those by second graders. 
Dictator proposals by the fourth and ninth graders show similar patterns, though not to the same 
extent.  
It is interesting to compare these results with those from Anderson et al. (2000). For U.S. 
college students, they find the same patterns we find for twelfth graders, while the Honduran 
students show no decline in dictator proposals if the ultimatum game is played first. They 
attribute this difference to a distaste for bargaining in the U.S. students, though obviously there 
are other differences between the groups. Whatever the cause, it is interesting that we find that 
the drop gets more severe as people get older. Note also that the drop does not come from older 
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children making small late round dictator proposals: these are almost identical across ages. 
Rather it comes from the older children making relatively high proposals in the early rounds. 
This wide variation in dictator proposals across rounds for older children explains part of the 
standard deviations in Table I. Within a given round, dictator proposals for the older children are 
quite homogenous. 
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To see how individual specific history matters, we ran separate regressions for each 
decision in each treatment, with independent variables representing outcomes in all previous 
play. There are 16 possible regressions, one for each of the 16 possible combinations of the four 
treatments and four roles. However, we can ignore the role of responder in the dictator game 
since there is no decision, and we can ignore the combinations where the decision is made in the 
first period of the treatment, since the player cannot be conditioning it on any history. For each 
of the remaining nine combinations of role and treatment we ran a regression on the decision, 
using any outcomes that have preceded that decision as explanatory variables. We use OLS for 
the ultimatum proposals, Tobit for the dictator regressions to account for the many proposals at 
zero, and probit for the binary ultimatum response.3 The coefficients and standard errors are 
shown in Table II.  
 The coefficients on the contemporaneous ultimatum proposal for the last three 
regressions in this table show that, as expected, larger proposals are more likely to be accepted. 
The only statistically significant effect of prior history is a finding, in one regression, that people 
whose ultimatum offers were rejected subsequently make larger dictator proposals than those 
whose proposals were rejected. (However, this coefficient is based on a small sample - only four 
people in this group had their proposals rejected.) In particular, we do not find any correlation 
between the dictator or ultimatum proposal a child receives and the dictator or ultimatum 
proposal they subsequently make themselves. This suggests that the children understand they are 
playing with different partners each time, and make independent decisions. 
Based on this table we argue that the noticeable decrease in dictator proposals that occurs 
among the older children when the dictator games are done later in the experiment is derived 
from some general effect having to do with playing the ultimatum game, rather than from 
individual specific history. We note that the result that history does not matter, but order does, 
has implications for the validity of models of fairness that are intended to explain behavior in 
these games. In particular, the result that the importance of order changes with age suggests that 
models that explain dictator game behaviors among adolescents and adults will not explain the 
behavior of young children. 
 
                                                 
3 The results are the same if we use ordered probit for the proposals to account for the fact that only integer 
responses are allowed, or if we just use OLS for all the regressions. 
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Table II: Does history matter? 
 
 Dictator proposal Ultimatum proposal Ultimatum rejection 
Round: 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
Model: Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS OLS+ Probit Probit 
Partner’s  0.354  -0.056  0.153 0.090  0.097 0.078 
dictator proposal (0.219)  (0.898)  (0.095) (0.059)  (0.110) (0.148) 
Partner’s   3.600* -31.577    -0.057  0.529 
ultimatum 
rejection 
 (1.827) (0.000)    (0.084)  (0.639) 
Partner’s   -0.531 -0.802 0.138  0.085 -0.110*** -0.603*** -0.570*** 
ultimatum 
proposal 




0.0105 0.0269 0.0277 0.0161 0.0209 0.0213 0.21144 0.4075 0.3323 
Observations 77 79 78 78 76 77 79 77 76 
Notes: Coefficients shown. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* means the underlying coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level, ** at the 
0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level. The dictator proposal regressions are done with Tobit, 
ultimatum proposals with OLS, and ultimatum rejections with probit. 
+ means unable to estimate probit because some responses were perfectly predicted, so results 
shown are for OLS.  
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Age, sex, and size 
 
Next we look at differences in proposals and responses across demographic variables, 
while controlling for order with regressions. Results are shown in Table III. For the order effects, 
the proposal regressions basically mirror what is shown in Figure II. Dictator proposals decrease 
with order, at a rate that accelerates with age. We omitted the order/grade interactions for the 
ultimatum game proposals, since there is no obvious pattern in Figure I. The age differences also 
mirror the Figure II results. The older children make significantly larger dictator and ultimatum 
proposals than the second graders do. These differences are not trivial: in the dictator game the 
average proposal is 1.2 tokens, and each year of age is associated with an increase in the 
proposal of about 0.23 tokens. For the ultimatum game the overall average proposal is 4.1 
tokens, and each year of age is associated with an increase of about 0.1 tokens. Large changes in 
behavior are occurring between the ages of 7 and 18. 
 The first regression for every behavior includes an indicator variable for sex. Boys tend 
to make smaller dictator and ultimatum proposals, though only the dictator difference is 
statistically significant. Boys are perhaps slightly less likely to reject a given ultimatum proposal, 
though the coefficient is not significant. We get insignificant coefficients if we add a sex with 
proposal interaction effect, to allow the gender effect to vary with proposal size, or an age with 
proposal interaction. These differences in proposals for boys and girls are similar to the 
differences cited in Eckel and Grossman (2001) for undergraduate men and women. 
Along with sex, the second regression for every behavior includes a measure of relative 
height. This is the percentage deviation of the participant’s height from the mean of all those 
who participated in the experiment with them – that is, their fellow class members. We measured 
the second graders ourselves at the end of the experiment, while the other heights are from a 
survey the students filled out before being paid. Relative height has a significant effect on 
dictator proposals: children who are one standard deviation taller than the mean propose about 
half a token less than children who are one standard deviation shorter. As a percentage, this 
effect is very large.  
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variable: Dictator proposal Ultimatum proposal Ultimatum rejection 
       
order -0.2567 -0.2563 -0.0012 0.0038 -0.0014 -0.0018 
 (0.176) (0.173) (0.0696) (0.0695) (0.0077) (0.0071) 
       
grade 0.2314*** 0.2283*** 0.0932*** 0.0927*** 0.0060** 0.0060** 
 (0.0607) (0.0594) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
       
order & grade -0.0529** -0.0524**     
interaction (0.0242) (0.0237)     
       
boy -0.4121** -0.2671 -0.0226 0.0473 -0.0102 -0.0152 
 (0.181) (0.185) (0.1569) (0.1636) (0.0170) (0.0171) 
       
height  -0.0354**  -0.0181  0.0016 
  (0.0143)  (0.0123)  (0.0012) 
       
ultimatum      -0.0441*** -0.0411*** 
proposal     (0.0135) (0.0138) 




0.0938 0.101 0.0436 0.0473 0.444 0.453 
Notes: 310 observations. Marginal effects are shown (cumulative for the Tobit). Standard errors 
of the marginal effects are in parentheses. * means the underlying coefficient is significantly 
different from 0 at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level. The dictator proposal 





Interestingly, height alone explains more of the variance in dictator and ultimatum 
proposals and ultimatum responses than sex alone does. For all three of these behaviors, adding 
height to a regression that includes sex improves the fit more than does adding sex to a 
regression that includes height. Adding it to the regression for dictator proposals decreases the 
sex coefficient and makes it insignificant at even the 10% level. Adding it to the ultimatum 
proposal regression actually changes the sign of the sex coefficient, though it is insignificant 
before and after the addition. We get similar results if we use a measure of height relative to 
others of the same sex in the experiment, rather than relative to everyone. The regression results 
on sex and height are essentially unchanged if we run the regressions with indicator variables for 
order and grade instead of the continuous measures. While there are some nonlinearities with age 
and order, the basic age and order patterns also hold.  
The age, sex and height story is more revealing if we just sort the girls and the boys in 
each class by height, and then evenly divide each sex into three groups: short, medium, and tall. 
While this doesn’t provide the controls for order that the regressions to, the design is balanced 
and so the means are still unbiased. Figure III shows average dictator proposals for kids grouped 
by age, sex and by this measure of relative height.4 If we look at the last pair of bars in the top 
panel of this figure, for the younger children, we see that, ignoring height, the proposals by 
young girls and boys are the same. But if we look across the first three pairs of bars we see that, 
for girls though not boys, there is a large decrease in proposals as height increases. The shortest 
girls give nearly four times more than the tall  ones. The tall boys give three times as much as the 
tall girls. 
For the older kids, shown in the bottom panel, the sex and height story is very different.  
The last pair of bars shows that, overall, the older girls give more than twice as much as older 
boys. The first three pairs of bars show that the height effect in girls has diminished , and that 
again that proposals by boys are similar across height. So, we find that for young children the 
heterogeneity in dictator proposals is driven entirely by height, not by sex. For the older children, 
it’s driven more by sex than by height. 
                                                 
4 We also did this with relative height by class only, rather than class and sex. This makes little difference for the 
younger kids, but because among the older students the males are on average taller, we end up with very unequal 
cell sizes.  
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Figure III: Average dictator proposals by age, sex and size. 
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Table A.III in the appendix shows the results of non-parametric tests for differences in 
dictator proposals according to sex and height. In addition to the ES and MW tests, we also 
report Fisher’s exact test of independence for the proportions of people making zero versus 
greater than zero proposals. These tests support the statistical significance of sex differences in 
proposals, particularly among the older children. For differences across the relative height groups 
the support is mixed: the ES test cannot reject the hypothesis that the distributions are the same, 
while the MW test and Fisher’s test both show a robust difference. The tests support the 
existence of differences by height in proposals by girls, though Fisher’s test is significant only at 
the 10% level. For boys, the support is weak: the ES test does not support a difference, and the 
MW and Fisher’s tests only support it at the 10% level. None of the tests can reject the 
hypothesis that the short boy/tall girl groups have the same contributions. Statistical significance 
also holds if we test these patterns using regressions that control for order effects as was done in 
Table III. A likelihood ratio test gives a p-value of  0.0364  for the hypothesis that saturated 
models with grade, sex, and interactions of age with sex and sex with height fit the dictator 
proposal data better than does a model with only the order, grade, and order with grade 
interaction variables. 
When we include relative height, it is hard to generalize about sex and fairness in the 
dictator game. For the younger kids, if we compare across the sexes while holding height 
constant, the sex difference actually switches sign in the tall kids, with tall boys giving more than 
tall girls. Across sex and height, short girls give the most, but tall girls give the least. For the 
ultimatum proposals, we don’t find any substantial sex differences. There is a modest and barely 
significant height effect, as the Table III regressions indicate, but it’s not monotonic in the boys. 
Interestingly, it seems to be relative rather than absolute height that matters. The twelfth graders 
are more than half again as tall as the second graders, but when playing against other twelfth 
graders, they actually make larger dictator and ultimatum proposals. 
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Rejections and optimal ultimatum proposals 
 
The analysis of rejections is only based on few observations, since just 30 of the 310 
proposals are rejected. Despite this, the relationship between the proposal amount and the 
probability of rejection is statistically significant in the regressions shown in the last two 
columns of Table II. Order does not appear to have any effect on the decision to reject a 
proposal. Older children are more likely to reject. A one token increase in the proposal decreases 
the probability of rejection by about 4%, and this effect is significant at the 1% level.  
We ran probit regressions on rejections separately for each of the four grades, with the 
proposal as the independent variable, and then used the estimated probit functions to predict 
rejection rates for different proposal amounts for each grade. Rounding off to halves, we find 
that proposals of 2.0, 3.5, 3.5, and 4.0 maximize the predicted returns for grades 2, 4/5, 9, and 12 
respectively.5 These results are shown in Table IV. For every grade, average actual proposals are 
higher than the estimated optimal proposals. Risk aversion, altruism, and upward bias in 
children’s estimation of the rejection probabilities are all possible explanations for this. The 
differences, both in terms of the deviation from the optimal proposal, and in terms of the loss in 
the expected return, are largest for the second graders, the age group least likely to be able to 
figure this out.  
                                                 
5 We get similar results, in levels and changes across grades, if we estimate this using a linear probability model, or 
if we pool the data across grades and add a variable for the grade to the regression.  
 23
Table IV: Average returns by ultimatum proposal and grade. 
 
 Grade 
Proposal Second Fourth / fifth Ninth Twelfth 
0.0 1.85 1.99 0.08 0.00 
1.0 5.28 3.61 0.83 0.00 
 1.5 6.65 4.40 1.86 0.00 
2.0 7.28 5.07 3.28 0.14 
2.5 7.28 5.53 4.69 0.88 
3.0 6.95 5.77 5.65 2.79 
3.5 6.49 * 5.78 5.99 4.87 
4.0 6.00 5.62 * 5.85 5.67 
4.5 5.50 5.31 5.47 * 5.47 * 
5.0 5.00 4.91 4.99 5.00 
6.0 4.00 3.99 4.00 4.00 
Average proposal 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.3 
Rejections / Obs. 8 / 74 15 / 106  3 / 90 4 / 40 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.542 0.456 0.404 0.444 
Notes:  Rejection probabilities are estimated using probit, separately for each grade.  
 Bold face indicates the proposal that maximizes the estimated return for that grade.  





 We can also use this data to look for connections between behaviors in the two games. 
None of the raw correlations between people’s dictator proposals, ultimatum proposals, and 
ultimatum rejections are statistically significant. This result seems at odds with the finding that 
proposals in both games and ultimatum responses all differ systematically with age, shown in 
Table III. We resolve this puzzle by looking at regressions that include behavior/grade 
interaction terms, shown in Table V.  
For the dictator proposal, we find that the coefficient on the direct effect is now negative 
and significant, while that on the interaction term is positive and significant. In other words, 
young children that are more generous in the dictator game tend to make smaller ultimatum 
proposals, while older children that are more generous in the dictator game tend to make larger 
ultimatum proposals. These effects cancel out when we omit the interaction, explaining the zero 
raw correlation. Results for ultimatum proposals are consistent with those for dictator proposals. 
The coefficients on the ultimatum response decision and its interaction are not significantly 
correlated with either proposal, and only the ultimatum proposal coefficient is significant, and 
that only at the 10% level. (The partner’s ultimatum proposal is included as a control for the 
ultimatum rejection decision.) 
 These results suggest that different models of behavior may be at work with different age 
children, and in particular that other-regarding preferences are more likely to be behind the 
bargaining decisions of the older children than the younger ones. However, while the coefficients 
in this regression are statistically significant, the r-squareds for the proposal regressions are very 
low. (The only exception is for the ultimatum rejection regression, but that is driven almost 
entirely by the explanatory power of the partner’s ultimatum proposal. With that variable 
omitted, the pseudo r-squared is 0.164) The r-squareds don’t increase if we just look at the ninth 
grade and older kids. The most reasonable conclusion should probably be that there is very little 
connection between behaviors in these games, at any age. 
 25
Table V: Within-subjects behavior regressions. 
 
 Dependent variable and regression model:  





Independent variable: Tobit OLS probit 
    
Ultimatum -0.616**  0.058 
proposal (0.257)  (0.114) 
    
Grade/ultimatum  0.080***  0.022* 
proposal interaction (0.021)  (0.012) 
    
Ultimatum -2.378 0.143  
response (2.356) (0.548)  
    
Grade/ultimatum 0.054 0.071  
response interaction (0.327) (0.078)  
    
Dictator  -0.210** -0.024 
proposal  (0.082) (0.161) 
    
Grade/dictator  0.028*** -0.007 
proposal interaction  (0.010) (0.021) 
    
Partner’s  -0.229 0.150** -0.757*** 
ultimatum proposal (0.275) (0.072) (0.107) 
    
Observations 310 310 310 
R-squared 0.0224 0.0355 0.4556 
Notes: Coefficients shown. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* means the underlying coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level, ** at the 
0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level. The dictator proposal regressions are done with Tobit, 
ultimatum proposals with OLS, and ultimatum rejections with probit. 
+ means unable to estimate probit because some responses were perfectly predicted, so results 
shown are for OLS.  
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Stated versus actual accept/reject decisions 
 
In addition to experimental data on ultimatum rejections, we have self-reported data from 
responses to the question “What is the smallest offer that you would accept?” collected in a 
survey immediately after the experiment. In Figure III we show a comparison of the actual and 
the hypothetical rejection rates (calculated from this question) for different proposals. The 
number of actual proposals at given levels are in parentheses. Despite the small numbers of 
observations in some cells, the general pattern of decreasing actual rejection rates with larger 
proposals is very intuitive. The pattern in the stated rejection rates is even more intuitive, both in 
its trend and in the differences from the actual data. For example, 51% of the subjects say that 
they would reject an offer of three tokens, but when actually confronted with this situation and 
actually losing their tokens if they reject, only 23% really do it.  
Most of the discrepancy between actual and stated behavior comes from boys. Using the 
ES test, we can reject the hypothesis that the distributions of lowest acceptable offers are the 
same for girls and boys at the 0.0000 p-value. On average, boys say that the lowest offer they 
will accept is 3.50 tokens, while for girls it is 3.14. On the other hand, the regressions in Table II 
show that, if anything, boys are actually less likely to reject a given ultimatum proposal. This 
difference is all due to sex: relative height does not have any statistically significant correlation 
with stated behavior. The sex difference in self-reports is highest among the younger children. 
One interpretation of children’s tendency to exaggerate their toughness as bargainers is that it is 
further evidence of their strategic abilities. This result also shows the importance of using real 
rather than hypothetical payments with children: the conclusions about sex differences flip, 
depending on which data are used.
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 In this paper we have shown that bargaining behavior changes systematically with age. In 
the dictator game children make considerably smaller proposals than adults do. Children also 
make, and accept, smaller ultimatum proposals than adults do. The youngest children make the 
lowest proposals and they have the highest acceptance rates, controlling for the proposal amount. 
Even young children are quite strategic, and are very good at playing the ultimatum game. All 
age groups make proposals that are close to maximizing the expected return, given the rejection 
rates. When making ultimatum proposals, we actually found that second graders earned more 
than any other age group, though this may have been as much due to their willingness to make 
small proposals as to their ability to predict rejection probabilities. When combined with the fact 
that the second graders give less in the dictator game, we interpret this to mean that the 
behavioral differences across ages are related to different preferences for fairness, not to 
differences in the ability to play strategically.  
This result gives a new twist to work by others on cross-cultural differences in economic 
behavior. Explanations of these cultural differences are either really about genetic differences, or 
they require that there be some way that different cultures persuade people with the same genes 
to behave differently. We suggest that this latter process happens in childhood, and we provide 
evidence of substantial behavioral changes in a sample of children from the same culture, over 
the ages seven to 18.  
We have also identified a height effect: relatively taller girls make much smaller dictator 
proposals, and they are more likely to reject ultimatum proposals. These differences do not 
decrease as children get more experience with the experiment, however they do decrease with 
age. This suggests that even within a culture individual differences in bargaining can be sensibly 
explained using characteristics that affect bargaining power outside the lab. The result that the 
height effect is supplanted by a sex effect around the age of puberty fits with evidence from the 
developmental psychology literature on a variety of prosocial (and other) behaviors, and from the 
evidence from economic experiments on men and women. We think the fact that the differences 
are larger for the dictator proposals than the ultimatum proposals makes good sense. Dictator 
proposals are purely a matter of the proposer’s preferences, while optimal ultimatum proposals 
must take the preferences of the responders into consideration. 
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To our knowledge no prior bargaining experiments have looked at variables such as 
height, though there is a large literature on sex differences, and a smaller one on status 
differences. While the evidence is mixed, the general conclusion is that, when making proposals 
to respondents of unknown sex, women make noticeably larger dictator proposals than men do, 
make nearly equivalent ultimatum proposals, and are considerably more likely to accept a given 
ultimatum proposal. Except for ultimatum responses, where we have very little data, these are 
exactly the results that we find for older children.  
We think these height results are not only intrinsically interesting, but also that they have 
implications for more important issues. When people behave differently it is either because they 
have different preferences or because they face different constraints. On a playground with 
sporadic adult supervision, decisions may involve very different constraints for a little kid than 
for a big one, and it would not be surprising to see smaller children “sharing” more than large 
ones. In our experiments, however, decisions are anonymous, and so the constraints are the same 
for everyone. Given this, the fact that different size kids make different decisions in the 
experiment means that different size kids have different preferences. In the dictator games with 
the younger kids, the differences in preferences implied by the proposal differences of the short 
and tall girls seem very large. Since we do not have data on the height of the older children when 
they were younger, we are not able to determine whether this effect is permanent or transitory. 
However, the Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman (2001) result on the permanent effect of 
adolescent height on adult income, cited above, suggests that it may well be. 
Bargaining is a basic economic process, determining how limited resources are allocated 
to competing interests. Children’s own resources are extraordinarily limited relative to their often 
apparently insatiable desires. Every day they must strike a host of complicated bargains with 
their parents, teachers, and peers in efforts to obtain things that, in their ultimate importance, 
range from trivial to vital. In this paper we have shown that children are rational and strategic 
bargainers by the age of seven, and that the sorts of tools that economists have successfully 
applied to studying the bargaining behavior of adults can also be used to study bargaining 




Table A.I: Participants by grade and treatment. 
 
Grade N Version 
2 16 A 
2 20 A 
2 20 B 
2 18 B 
 74  
   
4 28 A 
5 26 A 
4 28 B 
5 24 B 
 106  
   
9 25 A 
9 18 A 
9 22 B 
9 25 B 
 72  
   
12 20 A 
12 20 B 
 64  
   
Overall: 310  
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Forsythe et al. [1994] show that with ultimatum game proposals, the Epps and Singleton 
[1986] (ES) test of the hypothesis that data from different populations is drawn from the same 
underlying discrete distribution has considerably more power to reject the hypothesis that the 
distributions are the same when they are different than do the common non-parametric 
alternatives. This power is derived from the fact that the alternatives either assume a continuous 
rather than a discrete distribution, or only compare a measure of central tendency, rather than the 
entire distributions. Table A.II shows the results of tests of the hypothesis that the distribution of 
proposals for each game differ across grades, using this test as well as the more familiar Mann-
Whitney. 
 
Table A.II: Non-parametric tests of differences in proposals by grade and game. 
 
Dictator 
Grade 2 4/5 9 
4/5 1.07***,+++   
9 0.83***,+++ -0.25  
12 1.77***,+++ 0.70** 0.95**,++ 
 
Ultimatum 
Grade 2 4/5 9 
4/5 0.58***,+++   
9 0.97***,+++ 0.39+++  
12 0.81***,+++ 0.23+++ -0.16*,+++ 
 
Notes: The numbers are the row mean minus the column mean. 
*, **, and *** indicate the difference is significant at the 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01 level respectively 
using the Mann-Whitney test.  
+, ++, and ++ indicate the same using the Epps-Singleton test.  
 32
Table A.III shows the results of tests of the significance of differences in dictator proposals by 




Table A.III: Significance tests of dictator proposal differences by age, sex and height. 
 
 First group Second group P-value: 







All grades:        
     Girls vs. boys 140 1.46 170 0.965 0.102 0.0121 0.012 
     Short vs. tall  115 1.36 94 1.03 0.136 0.0741 0.040 
     Short girls vs. tall girls 52 1.85 42 0.95 0.193 0.0331 0.056 
     Short boys vs. tall boys 52 0.95 42 1.10 0.256 0.618 0.413 
        
2nd and 4th / 5th grades:        
     Girls vs. boys 83 1.00 97 0.97 0.467 0.4043 0.314 
     Short vs. tall  66 1.17 55 0.78 0.469 0.1248 0.151 
     Short girls vs. tall girls 31 1.39 25 0.360 0.230 0.0384 0.079 
     Short boys vs. tall boys 35 0.971 30 1.13 0.626 0.831 0.779 
        
9th and 12th grades:        
     Girls vs. boys 57 2.12 73 0.96 0.0158 0.0018 0.012 
     Short vs. tall  49 1.61 39 1.38 0.201 0.3863 0.197 
     Short girls vs. tall girls 21 2.52 17 1.82 0.381 0.3960 0.324 
     Short boys vs. tall boys 28 0.929 22 1.05 0.373 0.6429 0.548 






Note: The vocabulary given here was designed to make sense to the fourth graders. We used it as 
is on the ninth graders, except as noted. For the second graders, it was necessary to start by 
explaining the terms proposer and responder. In addition, the directions were given more slowly 
and with more examples. When giving the examples to the second graders we physically showed 
them the division and the allocation using the tokens. Whenever possible, we answered questions 
by repeating or rephrasing the words in the protocol. While these protocols were followed as 
closely as possible, we did  find it necessary to remind the children to pay attention and not talk 
to each other. Their teachers were very helpful with this.  
 
We did not tell them that the games would be repeated with different roles, or that two different 
games would be played. If asked, we just said “Sorry, we can’t tell you that. You will have to 
wait and see what happens.” 
 
 “We are going to play some games today. In these games you can get some tokens. When we 
are all done you can use the tokens to buy items from our store. Each token is worth about 25 
cents or a quarter. The stuff you buy in the store is about the same price as in a regular store. 
Here are the things we have to sell.”  
 
We then showed the kids the items in the store. We had a selection of toys and school supplies 
that have proved popular in previous experiments, and the children were invariably quite 
attentive after this. To avoid threshold effects, we did not tell them prices if asked but just 
repeated that prices were about the same as in a regular store. The ninth graders were told that 
each token could be traded in for 25 cents cash at the end of the experiment, the twelfth graders 
that each could be traded for 50 cents. We then used playing cards to randomly divide the class 
evenly into two groups, A and B, and we separated the groups to different sides of the classroom.  
 
“In each of these games half of you are going to be proposers and half responders. We are not 
going to tell you which you are until later, so pay attention to all the instructions about who does 
what. (For the second graders, we then explained what these terms meant.) Each of you will 
have a partner from the other group. We will decide who is a proposer and who is a responder by 
chance. We will also decide who is partner with who by chance, and we will keep it a secret. 
You will never know who your partner is, and they will never know who you are.” 
 
“I want you to know that no one else in the class will know what you choose to do in today’s 
game. To be sure of this, on your game sheets you will not even put your name, instead we will 
give you a number. So do not worry about other people in the game knowing what you choose, 
because they won’t.”  
 
“You will make all of your decisions by filling out forms that I give you. To help keep your 
choices secret, we will collect the forms in these envelopes. On your envelope is an ID number. 
 34
This is your personal ID number and you need to put it on all the papers that you fill out so that 
we make sure you get your tokens and so that everything you do is secret.” 
 
Depending on the treatment, we then either started with the ultimatum or the dictator game 
instructions below.  
 
Ultimatum Bargaining Protocol. 
 
“Here is the game. I am going to give you and your secret partner 10 tokens. Your job is to 
decide how to divide them. But we have a special way of doing this. We’ll call the first partner 
the proposer. First, the proposer will pick how many of the 10 tokens they want to keep for 
themselves and how many they want to offer to the other person. They can choose any 
combination that adds up to ten tokens. After they have decided this, we will tell their responder 
partner how many tokens the proposer offered them. Then it is the responders turn. They decide 
if they want to accept or reject the offer. If they accept, the proposer and the responder each get 
the amount of tokens that the proposer picked. If they reject then both the responder and the 
proposer get nothing.”  
 
“We’ll try it one time to make sure everyone understands. This is just an example, so it does not 
count for tokens. (Pick a child from the front.) Let’s pretend we are partners. Right now I can see 
who my partner is, but remember in the real game you will not know who your partner is. I will 
be the proposer, the person who decides how the chips are split up. You are the responder, who 
chooses if you accept or not. Suppose I choose 6 tokens for me and 4 for my partner. If you 
accept, that’s what we each get. If you reject, neither of us gets any tokens. 
 
Now let’s say that I said 7 for me and 3 for my partner. Suppose you said you will not accept 
this. Than we both get zero tokens. So does everybody understand? Are there any questions?” 
 
To group A (Tell group B to listen too.):  
 
“OK, you are the proposers who will make a proposal about how the tokens will be divided. You 
will be paired with another person in the other group. You will not know who they are and they 
will not know who you are. You will make a proposal about how to divide the tokens. If your 
partner accepts how you divided them, then that is how the 10 tokens will be divided. But if they 
reject your proposal you both get nothing. You can divide the tokens any way you want. Take 
the first form out of your envelope now. Be sure and write the number on your envelope on the 
top right side of the form. Make your choice by circling across the two numbers that you choose 
and then put your form back in your envelope. For example, you could circle 8 for you and 2 for 
your partner, or 3 for you and 7 for you partner. (When describing how to fill out the form, hold 
up a form as an example.) We have all the time you need, so think about what you want to do.”  
 
(Collect the envelopes from the proposers. Match proposers up with responders and fill out 
forms for the responders and put it in their envelopes. If there was an odd number of players, we 
matched one player with two partners when computing payoffs.) 
 
To group B:  
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“You are the responders. You will decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If you accept the 
offer then you will get the tokens that proposer offered to you and they will get the tokens for 
they proposed for themselves. If you do not accept the offer then both you and your partner will 
get zero tokens. In your envelope is a form that tells you how many tokens you have been 
offered. First, be sure and put your ID number on the envelope on the top right part of your 
paper. Has everybody done this? OK, now, circle the box to accept or reject the offer. Don’t 
rush, take your time and think about what you want to do.” 
 
(Collect the envelopes from the responders. Fill out the forms for the proposers, which tell what 
the responders decided to do. Put the appropriate number of tokens in the envelopes.) 
 
“OK, now we are going to do this same game again. But this time everybody will switch roles. 
So, if you were a proposer, this time you are a responder. If you were a responder, this time you 
are a proposer.” 
 
(Repeat the protocol, starting with the specific instructions to the proposers.) 
 
 
Dictator Bargaining Protocol: 
 
“Here is the game. I am going to give you and your secret partner 10 tokens. The proposer’s job 
is to decide how to split these tokens between the two people. Whatever the proposer says is 
final. The responder doesn’t really decide anything, they just get the tokens the proposer offers 
them, if any. (If this game followed the ultimatum game, we added “So, it’s different than the 
other game. This time the responder doesn’t get a chance to reject the split that the proposer 
makes. Whatever the proposer says goes.”) 
 
“We’ll try it one time to make sure everyone understands. This is just an example, so it does not 
count for tokens. (Pick a child from the front.) Let’s pretend we are partners. Right now I can see 
who my partner is, but remember in the real game you will not know who your partner is. I will 
be the proposer, the person who decides how the chips are split up. You are the responder. 
Suppose I choose 6 tokens for me and 4 for my partner. So, that’s what we each get.  
 
Now let’s say that I said 7 for me and 3 for my partner. So, that’s what we each get.  
So does everybody understand? Are there any questions?” 
 
To group A (Tell group B to listen too.):  
 
“OK, you are the proposers who will make a proposal about how the tokens will be divided. You 
will be paired with another person in the other group. You will not know who they are and they 
will not know who you are. You will make a proposal about how to divide the tokens. Whatever 
you decide goes. You can divide the tokens any way you want. Take the first form out of your 
envelope now. Be sure and write the number on your envelope on the top right side of the form. 
Make your choice by circling across the two numbers that you choose and then put your form 
back in your envelope. For example, you could circle 8 for you and 2 for your partner, or 3 for 
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you and 7 for you partner. (When describing how to fill out the form, hold up a form as an 
example.) We have all the time you need, so think about what you want to do.”  
 
(Collect the envelopes from the proposers. Match proposers up with responders and fill out 
forms for the responders and put it in their envelopes. If there was an odd number of players, we 
matched one player with two partners when computing payoffs.) 
 
To group B:  
 
“You are the responders. The form in your envelope tells you how many tokens your partner gets 
and how many you get.” 
 
(Collect the envelopes from the responders. Fill out the forms for the proposers, which tell what 
the responders decided to do. Put the appropriate number of tokens in the envelopes.) 
 
“OK, now we are going to do this same game again. But this time everybody will switch roles. 
So, if you were a proposer, this time you are a responder. If you were a responder, this time you 
are a proposer.” 
 





After all 4 rounds, we passed out sheets to the children, with the prices of the items in the store. 
We asked them to write down how many of each item they wanted, and to make sure they didn’t 
spend more than they had. We then collected these sheets along with their envelopes with the 
tokens, put the items in bags, and returned them. For the ninth and twelfth graders we collected 
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